In a previous article, we surveyed the growing wave of PFAS false advertising class actions sweeping industries from pet food to outdoor apparel. A ruling issued this March underscores how fast this issue is developing. In Cavalier et al. v. Apple, Inc., Case No. 25-cv-00713-PCP (N.D. Cal., Mar. 16, 2026) the court allowed a PFAS false advertising class action to proceed against Apple related to the alleged presence of PFHxA in certain of its watch bands. The order provides ample material for commentary, but our focus here will be to examine four key developments that could affect the landscape of PFAS litigation going forward.
1. Standing Without Showing the Plaintiffs’ Products Were Affected
Perhaps the most significant development relates to Article III standing. Plaintiffs originally alleged that Apple watch bands contained PFHxA because an academic paper tested various fluoroelastomer watch bands on the market and reported anonymized, aggregated results that the products, generally, contained PFHxA. Plaintiffs then amended their complaint to include independent laboratory results showing PFHxA in an Apple watch band Plaintiffs purchased after they filed their lawsuit.
The court held this to be sufficient, even though the complaint still lacked any direct allegation that the specific products plaintiffs purchased contained PFHxA. The court acknowledged the existence of other cases finding similar omissions fatal to PFAS false advertising claims but still allowed plaintiffs to use a representative product. The court’s order permitted this product purchased for litigation purposes to stand as proxy for all class members’ purchases spanning a decade of manufacturing in which material composition, supplier inputs, and quality controls may have varied significantly. This holding may create difficulties for plaintiffs at later stages, but the court’s decision to defer standing concerns and authorize discovery is a significant development that raises questions about whether pleading and standing requirements in PFAS litigation are being upheld.
2. Misrepresentation Without an Affirmative Statement
Another development worth noting is the court’s approval of Plaintiffs’ false advertising theory absent affirmative representations that the products were “healthy” or “environmentally sustainable.” Instead, the court reasoned that because the product’s central function was to monitor health, allegedly elevated PFAS levels did not fit that function.
Such reasoning imputes obligations to disclose PFAS (or any other forever chemical) for any product whose central function involves health, wellness, or benefit of the environment (encompassing broad swaths of wearable technology). Under this approach, the duty-to-disclose analysis would no longer require isolating a specific misleading statement. Apparently, so long as a product is designed to improve health, courts could hold that potential chemical hazards run counter to the product’s central function even absent representations about specific chemicals or the product’s safety.
3. PFAS Phase-Out Program As Evidence of Knowledge and Misrepresentation
Further, the court’s treatment of Apple’s PFAS phase-out program is important for manufacturers trying to eliminate PFAS from their products. Apple argued that the public could not have reasonably understood from its marketing that its health devices were PFAS free. Apple had publicly committed to a PFAS phase-out program, thereby acknowledging that certain of its products contain PFAS. Apple argued any reasonable consumer would expect Apple products to contain PFAS during the phase-out period.
But the court reasoned that the public phase-out program demonstrated that Apple knew its products contained PFAS and that the levels of PFHxA in watchbands exceeded the levels its own program established. The alleged misrepresentation was not the existence of PFHxA, but that the levels exceeded Apple’s voluntary targets. Companies managing PFAS transition programs should carefully assess whether actual product testing data aligns with that program and any public statements. Companies may also want to consider couching phase-out targets in more aspirational terms to avoid the “partial representation” problem identified here.
4. Erosion of the Economic Loss Rule in PFAS Cases
Finally, the Cavalier court curtailed the economic loss defense to misrepresentation claims. Even though the Plaintiffs expressed their damages in terms of the premium they allegedly paid for “healthy” watchbands, the court rejected Apple’s economic loss rule defense. The court cited Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. 17 Cal. 5th 1, 19 (2024), which held that fraud-based claims could survive the economic loss rule where the risk of fraudulent conduct is not among the risks contracting parties “reasonably contemplated or allocated.” The court applied Rattagan, reasoning that (1) plaintiffs and class members did not contractually allocate the risk Apple had misrepresented their products’ chemical safety profile, (2) plaintiffs’ negligent misrepresentation claim was not premised on negligence but rather “a species of the tort of deceit” and (3) the alleged misrepresentations exposed plaintiffs to health risks, not merely financial ones.
Looking Ahead
Cavalier is a single case, and time will tell if its views are more broadly adopted. But what the case makes clear is that PFAS litigation is unpredictable and developing fast. Pathways to the discovery phase are evolving as are the products and companies subject to these disputes. Manufacturers and retailers are well advised to understand the chemical composition of their products, any programs to phaseout use of certain chemicals, and all related public disclosures.
