Under the US Criminal Code’s compassionate release provision, a court may reduce a criminal sentence after it is imposed if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.”[1]
On May 28, 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States issued two decisions — Rutherford v. United States[2]and Fernandez v. United States[3]— holding that two specific sorts of considerations are categorically ineligible to satisfy that standard. In Rutherford, the Court held that compassionate release can never be based on the possible unfairness suffered by individuals sentenced under a statute Congress later makes more lenient via a non-retroactive amendment. And in Fernandez, the Court held that because Congress has provided for the possibility of habeas corpus for individuals who say they are innocent and were wrongly convicted, compassionate release is not a proper vehicle for claims of innocence.
Taken together, Rutherford and Fernandez make clear that while the range of considerations on which compassionate release may be based is broad, it is not limitless, and compassionate release generally cannot be used as a vehicle for second-guessing decisions Congress made about sentencing law and policy.
Rutherford v. United States
In Rutherford, the Court considered whether a defendant may obtain compassionate release based on the fact that he would have received a substantially more lenient penalty if sentenced under current law. The case arose from Congress’s amendment of the statute establishing the federal criminal penalty for use or possession of a firearm in connection with the commission of certain crimes. The amendment eliminated certain “stacked” mandatory minimums for first-time offenders, but did not apply retroactively (i.e., to defendants who had already been sentenced).
The Court held that when Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive, the resulting disparity cannot serve as an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release. As the Court explained, non-retroactivity is the default rule in federal sentencing, so disparities resulting from prospective changes in law are not “extraordinary.” Nor, the Court said, are they “compelling.” To the contrary, the disparities result from Congress’s deliberate decision not to disturb existing sentences when making a change in the law, the Court said.
The Court also rejected reliance on Sentencing Commission policy statements that would permit courts to consider such disparities. Although Congress authorized the Commission to identify “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” that authority is limited: policy statements must be “consistent with” the governing statute, and courts must independently interpret and apply the statutory standard. To the extent the Commission’s 2023 policy statement would permit courts to treat non-retroactive sentencing changes as a basis for relief, the Court held, it is inconsistent with the governing statutes.
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, dissented, arguing that the Sentencing Commission acted within its delegated authority and that district courts should retain discretion to consider sentencing disparities as part of an individualized assessment.
Fernandez v. United States
In Fernandez, the Court addressed whether a federal prisoner may invoke the compassionate release statute to argue that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted. The Court said no. Specifically, it held that “a prisoner who collaterally attacks the validity of his conviction must proceed through” habeas corpus, not compassionate release. The Court explained that Congress has established a “reticulated scheme” governing collateral review, and that claims “close to the core of habeas corpus” must be brought under “the specific federal habeas corpus statute” prescribed for relief. Allowing such claims to proceed through compassionate release would permit prisoners to evade the procedural and substantive constraints Congress placed on claims of innocence and would thus “wholly frustrate explicit congressional intent.”
The Court further emphasized that the text and structure of the compassionate release statute confirm that it is not designed to remedy flawed convictions that could be invalidated via other means. Compassionate release is directed toward “extraordinary and compelling reasons” grounded in a defendant’s personal circumstances, not toward revisiting the validity of a conviction. The statute’s focus on “compassion” reflects its purpose of granting mercy, not “righting legal wrongs,” and its remedial design — permitting only a reduction in sentence rather than vacatur — underscores that distinction.
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Kagan, concurred in the judgment, but rejected the majority’s invocation of the habeas statute as a basis for the result. Instead, those two Justices opined that “[a] motion for compassionate release cannot justify a reduced sentence if it relies solely on facts a court already considered in imposing the initial sentence, rather than any changed circumstances that developed after sentencing.” Justice Jackson alone dissented, arguing that the statute’s broad reference to “extraordinary and compelling reasons” should permit courts to consider claims of legal invalidity in appropriate circumstances and that the majority’s approach unduly narrows the scope of relief Congress authorized.
Practical Implications
Taken together, Rutherford and Fernandez make clear that while broad, the range of considerations that can support compassionate release in federal criminal cases is not limitless. Instead, the statute operates within boundaries defined by Congress’s broader sentencing framework and cannot be employed to override policy choices Congress has already made.
*Bracewell summer associate Abby Caldwell provided invaluable assistance with this client alert.
[1] 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
[2] 608 U.S. ___.
[3] 608 U.S. ___.
