By: Joshua Pearson
The Trump Administration has taken the unprecedented step of inviting private companies to apply for permits to mine the deep seabed in areas beyond national jurisdiction.[1] The Administration notes that the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, an obscure statute enacted in 1980, provides the authority to conduct the action.[2] Relying on this domestic statute, the Administration asserts that the United States may unilaterally authorize deep-sea mining activities in international waters, notwithstanding the multilateral governance established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and administered by the International Seabed Authority.[3]
While thirty-two countries have called for a moratorium amid scientific uncertainty and ecological risk, industry advocates argue that securing seabed critical minerals is essential to counter China’s dominance in supply chains.[4] The Executive Order (“EO”) seeks to accelerate the development of a domestic deep-sea mining industry by directing National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”) and the Department of the Interior to expedite permitting processes, expand seabed mapping, strengthen allied collaboration, and explore financing mechanisms.[5] The breadth and suddenness of the initiated EO, however, raise a multitude of international legal concerns and may expose corporations to legal liability.[6]
First, accelerating permits for mining in areas beyond national jurisdiction risks undermining longstanding precedents held in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), which treats deep seabed resources in international waters as the “common heritage of mankind” and places regulatory authority with the International Seabed Authority (“ISA”).[7] Although the United States has not ratified UNCLOS and thus is not beholden to the regulatory bodies, it has historically recognized many of its provisions as reflective of “customary international law.”[8] It remains an open question whether the “common heritage” principle itself has solidified into customary international law, and if so, whether the United States would be bound despite non-ratification.[9] Therefore, accelerating unilateral permits in areas beyond national jurisdiction risks departing from the cooperative, multilateral regime that has governed seabed resource management for decades.[10] Consequently, it may weaken the authority of the ISA, undermine the controlling force of the “common heritage” principle, and signal a retreat from established international practice.[11] Over time, such a shift could erode confidence in shared governance structures and invite competing claims by other states, increasing legal uncertainty and geopolitical tension in the deep seabed mining sector.[12]
Second, the EO advances commercial extraction in ecosystems that remain scientifically underexamined.[13] Deep-sea habitats are among the least understood on the planet, and the long-term ecological consequences of polymetallic node harvesting, sediment plumes, and habitat disruption remain largely unexplored.[14] By expediting leasing and permitting before comprehensive environmental impact research is conducted, the EO increases the likelihood that companies will operate amid regulatory uncertainty and unclear environmental standards.[15] This regulatory and scientific uncertainty creates corporate liability exposure.[16]
Firms engaged in seabed mining may face: (1) litigation under domestic environmental statutes, including the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the Clean Water Act (CWA); (2) derivative or shareholder suits alleging inadequate risk disclosure regarding environmental, financial, and reputational risks; (3) reputational and ESG-based investor actions; (4) and potential claims under customary international law like UNCLOS or other international environmental principles, particularly if operations are perceived as bypassing multilateral frameworks.[17] As the global standard for deep-sea mining continues to develop, companies could also confront claims rooted in customary international law or international environmental principles, particularly if operations are perceived as bypassing regulatory frameworks.[18]
In conclusion, while the EO positions seabed minerals as a strategic asset in geopolitical competition, its execution risks diverging from established international governance models and exposing private actors to significant environmental and financial liability.[19] This is especially concerning in a field where scientific knowledge is incomplete, and the legal framework remains unsettled.
[1] Exec. Order No. 14285, 90 Fed. Reg. 17735 (Apr. 24, 2025).
[2] Id.
[3] See Trevor Hunnicutt, Trump to Speed Permits for Deep-Sea Mining in International Waters, Reuters (Jan. 21, 2026, at 12:08 ET), https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-speed-permits-deep-sea-mining-international-waters-2026-01-21/ [https://perma.cc/3JDQ-Q2RY]; see also Rebecca Loomis, The Trump Administration Is Racing to Launch the Deep-Sea Mining Industry, Despite Huge Risks and Broad Opposition, Nat. Res. Def. Council (Jan. 26, 2026), https://www.nrdc.org/bio/rebecca-loomis/trump-administration-racing-launch-deep-sea-mining-industry-despite-huge-risks#international (on file with the American University Business Law Review) (noting the Trump Administration’s use of the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act to support unilateral authorization of deep-sea mining activities in international waters, in tension with multilateral governance under the UNCLOS and the ISA).
[4] Gracelin Baskaran & Meredith Schwartz, Trump’s Deep-Sea Mining Executive Order: The Race for Critical Minerals Enters Uncharted Waters, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud. (Apr. 25, 2025), https://www.csis.org/analysis/trumps-deep-sea-mining-executive-order-race-critical-minerals-enters-uncharted-waters [https://perma.cc/5WVX-GMF2].
[5] Id.; see Miranda Fox, Interior Advances Trump Executive Order on Deep Seabed Mining, Earthjustice (June 12, 2025), https://earthjustice.org/press/2025/interior-advances-trump-executive-order-on-deep-seabed-mining [https://perma.cc/3VSG-H8XV].
[6] Patrick Pearsall et al., Mining of the Deep-Sea — The Trump Administration’s Executive Order, the International Law Framework and Implications for Investors, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP (July 21, 2025), https://www.gibsondunn.com/mining-of-the-deep-sea-trump-administration-executive-order-international-law-framework-and-implications-for-investors/ [https://perma.cc/FFC3-24J9] (noting that unilateral U.S. licensing of deep-sea mining may expose investors to regulatory uncertainty, litigation risk, and potential corporate liability if such activities are later found inconsistent with international law).
[7] Brief of the Scientific Advisory Board on: Deep-Sea Mining, Int’l Seabed Auth., https://isa.org.jm/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/250403-DSM-Brief-Rev-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WND-Q9YY].
[8] U.S. Already Abides by UNCLOS as a Matter of Customary International Law and Domestic Policy, UNCLOS Debate, https://www.unclosdebate.org/argument/855/us-already-abides-unclos-matter-customary-international-law-and-domestic-policy [https://perma.cc/J8MM-DLZK].
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Mahlet Mesfin, Current Geopolitics Shift Deep-Sea Mining Debates, Stimson Ctr. (Feb. 23, 2026), https://www.stimson.org/2026/current-geopolitics-shift-deep-sea-mining-debates/ [https://perma.cc/EAZ5-DXD3].
[13] Rob Hutchins, Trump’s Deep-Seabed Mining Move “An Environmental Disaster,” Oceanographic Mag. (Apr. 25, 2025), https://oceanographicmagazine.com/news/trumps-deep-seabed-mining-move-an-environmental-disaster/ [https://perma.cc/QF9U-T2BD].
[14] See Andrew D. Thaler, Impacts of Deep-Sea Mining on Migratory Species: Review and Knowledge Gaps 1, 21 (2025), https://www.cms.int/sites/default/files/document/2025-11/cms_cop15_doc.25.2.3_annex1_dsm-report_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZC5-CQ2V]; Marianne de Beer & Mark van der Wal, The Impact of Deep-Sea Mining on Biodiversity, Climate and Human Cultures, IUCN (Mar. 1, 2024), https://www.iucn.nl/en/story/the-impact-of-deep-sea-mining-on-biodiversity-climate-and-human-cultures/ [https://perma.cc/VD7C-64EC] (explaining that polymetallic nodules are widely distributed seabed deposits whose extraction produces plumes of sediment that spread over large areas, destroying habitats, threatening largely undescribed species, and causing long-term ecosystem and ocean-wide impacts).
[15] Id.
[16] Laura Deeley Bren, Environmental Liability Exposures for Businesses – What You Need to Know (Feb. 18, 2026), Deeley Ins. Grp., https://deeleyinsurance.com/environmental-liability-exposures-for-businesses-what-you-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/EM6G-MXW6].
[17] Brenda Hamilton, Deep Sea Mining Litigation Risk: What NOAA’s New Rule and the UK License Challenge Mean for Capital Raises, Hamilton & Assocs. L. Grp. (Feb. 12, 2026), https://www.securitieslawyer101.com/2026/02/12/deep-sea-mining-litigation-risk/ [https://perma.cc/T7Z8-55LL].
[18] John Zadeh, Deep Sea Mining: International Regulations and Challenges, DiscoveryAlert (Mar. 30, 2025), https://discoveryalert.com.au/deep-sea-mining-controversy-2025-environmental-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/64M3-SW4Q].
[19] Christina G. Hioureas et al., A Challenge to the Constitution for the Ocean? Understanding Trump’s Deep Sea Mining Executive Order, Foley Hoag LLP (May 29, 2025), https://foleyhoag.com/news-and-insights/blogs/energy-and-climate-counsel/2025/may/a-challenge-to-the-constitution-for-the-ocean-understanding-trump-s-deep-sea-mining-executive-order/ [https://perma.cc/A6RS-YUAL].
