The Verdict Is In
The Department of Justice (DOJ) is serious about criminal enforcement for customs fraud. In March 2025, we warned that customs and tariff fraud had become a criminal enforcement priority for the DOJ, not just an administrative customs matter. In June 2025, we noted that the DOJ had made it official, explicitly naming trade and customs fraud among its top ten white-collar enforcement priorities. A recent federal guilty plea confirms that the government is prepared to use its enforcement tools aggressively — and against targets that may surprise companies accustomed to thinking of customs risk as someone else’s problem.
On April 27, 2026, Boise Cascade Company pleaded guilty in the Southern District of Florida and agreed to pay more than $6.3 million after admitting it purchased Chinese-origin plywood that had been illegally transshipped to evade antidumping and countervailing duties. The scheme originated with Boise Cascade supplier Horizon Plywood, whose principals were previously sentenced for evading more than $42 million in duties. But Boise Cascade was not Horizon’s co-conspirator in any traditional sense. It was the customer.
That is the point. Boise Cascade was prosecuted not as an importer of record, not as a falsifier of customs documents, but as a knowing purchaser of goods it had reason to believe were fraudulently imported. For general counsel (GCs) and compliance officers, that distinction matters enormously.
| Key takeaway: A U.S. company and its executives can face federal criminal liability for customs evasion without ever filing a customs entry, without acting as the importer of record, and without generating a single false document. Continued purchasing from a supplier you know is cheating on duties may be enough. |
Why This Case Is Different
Historically, customs enforcement focused on the importer of record, the company whose name appears on the entry documents and who is responsible for accurately reporting classifications, valuations, country-of-origin declarations, and all other entry elements to Customs and Border Protection (CBP). In the few prior cases where downstream purchasers were pursued, they typically had a direct hand in generating the false paperwork.
Boise Cascade had no such role. The government’s theory was simpler and, in many respects, more alarming: the company knew its supplier was cheating, and it kept buying anyway.
The facts laid out in the plea agreement make clear why the government felt it had a strong case:
- Horizon provided a certification claiming the plywood came from a Malaysian mill. That mill told Boise Cascade directly that it did not produce the product.
- An internal Boise email allegedly responded to that news with the question: “So Horizon lied again?”
- Boise Cascade knew Horizon was the subject of a federal search warrant and an ongoing investigation.
- After learning of that investigation, Boise Cascade placed at least 10 new orders with Horizon in the two weeks following the search warrant .
- The pricing Boise Cascade received from Horizon was unavailable from any other supplier, which itself is a red flag when significant duties should be affecting landed cost.
Taken together, these facts gave the government what it needed to argue not negligence but actual knowledge or willful blindness, followed by deliberate continuation of the purchasing relationship. That was enough for the DOJ to charge Boise Cascade with knowingly purchasing goods that had been imported unlawfully. In this case, the DOJ charged a violation of the Lacey Act (16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(1) and § 3373(d)(1)(B)), which applies to illegally imported plants (including plywood). But the DOJ premised the unlawful importation on Horizon’s tariff evasion. The federal smuggling statute, 18 U.S.C. § 545, separately criminalizes the receipt, purchase, or sale of merchandise after importation by anyone who knows the goods were imported contrary to law — and applies broadly across product categories. Consequently, the DOJ’s targeting of a purchaser on this theory can extend to a broad range of goods.
The Broader Enforcement Environment
The Boise Cascade case does not exist in isolation. It is one data point in a pattern of escalating enforcement that GCs and compliance officers should have squarely on their radar.
The DOJ has committed to this as a priority. In May 2025, former Criminal Division Chief Matthew Galeotti announced ten high-impact white-collar enforcement priorities. Customs and trade fraud, including tariff evasion, made the list alongside health care fraud, corporate recidivism, and national-security-linked corruption. As Galeotti framed it, trade fraudsters undermine the administration’s efforts to create jobs and ensure that American businesses compete on a level playing field.
Chinese-origin transshipment is a particular focus. CBP and the DOJ are paying close attention to goods allegedly manufactured in third countries that are actually of Chinese origin, rerouted to avoid antidumping, countervailing, or Section 301 duties. The Boise Cascade facts follow a classic transshipment pattern: Chinese plywood certified as Malaysian, priced suspiciously below market, purchased by a U.S. company that had mounting reason for doubt.
Undervaluation is a related and growing concern. Press coverage from earlier this year reported a notable divergence between the declared per-container values of imports arriving in the United States and the values of Chinese exports to the rest of the world. That gap may reflect widespread undervaluation at U.S. entry.
CBP has limited leverage over foreign actors. Foreign freight forwarders, brokers, and manufacturers who participate in these schemes can dissolve, reorganize, and reopen under new names. That dynamic shifts enforcement pressure toward the U.S. party that actually received the goods and benefited economically from the fraud.
DDP is no longer a safe harbor. The Boise Cascade enforcement action is a stark reminder that purchasing goods on DDP Incoterms (Delivered Duty Paid) does not shield U.S. purchasers from CBP and tariff liability. Over the past year especially, many companies have shifted to DDP arrangements in which a foreign manufacturer or supplier serves as the importer of record, believing that this structure insulates the U.S. purchaser from the increasingly complex tariff regime and related CBP compliance obligations. Boise Cascade demonstrates that the DOJ is willing to look beyond the formal importer of record where the surrounding facts suggest tariff evasion. In particular, where a U.S. purchaser knows or should know that it is receiving “sweetheart” pricing that is inconsistent with the actual value of the goods and the tariffs that should apply, the DOJ may argue — as it did in Boise Cascade — that the purchaser is criminally responsible for evading duties.
What GCs and Compliance Officers Should Do Now
The legal and enforcement landscape that produced the Boise Cascade prosecution is not going to relax. Here is a practical framework for assessing and reducing your company’s exposure.
1. Stop assuming that “not the importer” means “not at risk”
If your company purchases imported goods from third parties, particularly in high-duty product categories or from suppliers sourcing from China, you have customs-related exposure, regardless of who is listed as importer of record. The question is not whether your name appears on a CBP entry form. The question is what you knew, what you should have known, and what you did after you found out.
2. Government enforcement involving a trade partner puts your business on “notice” of possible criminal activity
Prosecutors will focus on what your business knows from public sources, communications, and warnings. If your business knows that your trade partner is in trouble with a government agency or had their business searched pursuant to a search warrant, that can put your business on notice that the goods are not being imported with the appropriate descriptions and duties paid.
3. Treat suspicious pricing as a red flag, not a windfall
When antidumping, countervailing, Section 301, Section 232, or other significant duties apply to a product, those duties affect landed cost. A supplier offering pricing that seems to ignore that math deserves scrutiny
4. Scrutinize country-of-origin and transshipment representations
Do not accept certifications at face value when red flags exist. Request documentation sufficient to support a credible origin determination: mill certifications, manufacturer affidavits, bills of lading, and packing lists. Where a supplier’s claimed country of origin does not align with other evidence, investigate before continuing to purchase.
5. Understand your DDP and broker-controlled import arrangements
When a foreign seller or broker handles importation on your behalf, you may have limited visibility into what is actually being declared to CBP. That lack of visibility is a risk factor, not a shield. Review the terms under which you buy goods and understand who controls the customs entry process and what documentation underlies it.
6. Build meaningful escalation procedures for customs red flags
The Boise Cascade facts include an internal email that essentially acknowledged the supplier had lied again, followed by continued purchasing. That sequence is what made the case. Companies need procedures that ensure when employees learn of suspicious pricing, inconsistent documentation, a supplier investigation, or contradictory origin representations, those facts trigger review and, if warranted, a suspension of purchasing. Document the process.
7. Include customs diligence in M&A and major sourcing arrangements
Acquisitions, significant distributor relationships, and major new sourcing arrangements should include meaningful customs due diligence: who is the importer of record, what are the duty obligations, how does the supplier’s pricing compare to those obligations, and can the entry documentation be reviewed and verified? These are not exotic questions. They are the kind of questions that can prevent a criminal investigation down the road.
8. Consider voluntary disclosure where violations are identified
If your review uncovers prior underpayments or potential violations, the path forward depends heavily on the facts. Voluntary disclosure to CBP is an option that can reduce penalties and, in some circumstances, affect the calculus around criminal referral.
Bottom Line
Boise Cascade is a warning shot aimed squarely at U.S. companies that are not importers of record but benefit economically from improperly imported goods. The government’s theory in this case, that knowing continued purchasing from a suspected duty evader makes you part of the scheme, is consistent with the DOJ’s stated enforcement priorities.
The environment that produced this case is not an outlier. It reflects deliberate policy: more criminal enforcement of trade and customs laws, closer scrutiny of Chinese-origin imports, and a willingness to pursue U.S. parties that sit downstream from the actual fraud. CBP’s difficulty in pursuing foreign brokers and freight forwarders only increases the incentive to focus on the U.S. company at the end of the transaction.
Companies should not wait for a subpoena, a search warrant, or a whistleblower allegation to examine their supply chains. If your business purchases imported products from third parties, relies on foreign suppliers operating on DDP terms, or sources from high-duty product categories with Chinese supply chain exposure, now is the time to conduct that review.
