On April 17, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued its second decision in Secretary of Labor v. KC Transport, Inc., a long-running case concerning the Mine Safety and Health Administration’s (MSHA) jurisdictional limits—but its extremely narrow view of the facts provides little guidance beyond the case’s specific circumstances.
Quick Hits
- The D.C. Circuit held that an off-site repair facility located near a mine and used primarily to service coal haul trucks qualified as a “mine” under the Mine Act but avoided addressing broader MSHA jurisdictional questions.
- After the Supreme Court returned the case following Loper Bright, the D.C. Circuit adopted a fact-intensive test asking whether a facility is “necessarily connected with the use and operation of extracting, milling, or processing coal and other minerals,” finding jurisdiction based on the facility’s proximity to the mine, its mining-related purpose, and the trucks’ exclusive use on mine roads.
- The ruling’s heavy reliance on case-specific facts leaves significant uncertainty about MSHA’s jurisdictional reach over facilities with even slightly different characteristics.
This saga began in 2019 when an MSHA inspector visited a mine to terminate a citation issued for a haul truck operated by KC Transport, Inc. The truck had since been taken to a repair facility—a parking lot and two shipping containers—located 1,000 feet off a haul road, about a mile from the mine. KC Transport used the facility for both mining and non-mining services.
While there, the inspector issued citations for two additional haul trucks also used to haul coal for the mine operator.
KC Transport challenged MSHA’s jurisdiction over trucks located off mine property. The key question was whether the facility met the definition of a “mine” under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act). Specifically, was the repair facility a “facilit[y] … used in, or to be used in, or resulting from” extraction or milling under Section C of that definition?
An administrative law judge found MSHA had jurisdiction, but the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (FMSHRC) overturned that decision. On this case’s first trip to the D.C. Circuit, the court remanded the case to FMSHRC based on the court’s unique take on Chevron deference. KC Transport immediately appealed the D.C. Circuit decision to the Supreme Court of the United States. After Chevron was overturned in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the Supreme Court sent the case back for the D.C. Circuit to determine its best reading of the statute.
After that circuitous journey, a majority of the D.C. Circuit panel rejected limiting MSHA’s jurisdiction to extraction sites, appurtenant roads, and preparation sites—in short, mine property—but also rejected a limitless reach for “used in, or to be used in, or resulting from” mining. Instead, the court ruled that a facility is a “mine” under Section C when it is “necessarily connected with the use and operation of extracting, milling, or processing coal and other minerals.”
Applying that test, the court emphasized several factors:
- the facility’s proximity to the mine;
- that it was built with the mine operator’s permission;
- that 60 percent of its services were mine-related; and
- that the trucks operated solely on mine haul roads, extraction sites, and at a preparation plant.
In short, “[t]he cited trucks were actively being used to haul coal from the … extraction site to the preparation plant.” Ultimately, the court found that these factors turned the repair facility into a mine:
“Under the best reading of the statute, a facility that is this close to extraction sites and a preparation plant and used to service trucks that routinely haul coal between those locations, and which is built specifically for this purpose is a ‘mine.’”
The court sidestepped “calls on the margins” such as “the definition of ‘mine’ with respect to moveable objects or items used long ago.” Indeed, the court admitted that the Mine Act’s text—and by extension the court’s decision interpreting that text—“does not provide a framework from which regulated parties can perfectly predict the scope of MSHA’s jurisdiction with respect to all movable objects.”
Unanswered Questions
This decision does little to clarify MSHA’s jurisdictional reach. By avoiding harder questions, the court left boundaries unclear. Here, the key factor was that trucks used in mining were serviced at the facility. But how far does that principle extend? What about a manufacturer sending technicians to service mine equipment? What about a facility that services mine equipment only 20 percent of the time?
Because this decision relies so heavily on the specific facts of the case, it is unclear how even small deviations from those facts might affect future outcomes. Additional uncertainty is the only clear result.
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